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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate how reductions of barriers to migration aﬀect the decision of
middle school graduates to attend high school in rural China. Change in the cost of migration
is identiﬁed using exogenous variation across counties in the timing of national identity card
distribution, which make it easier for rural migrants to register as temporary residents in urban
destinations. We make use of a large panel household and village data set supplemented by an
original follow-up survey, and ﬁnd a robust negative relationship between migrant opportunity
and high school enrollment. This eﬀect is consistent with our ﬁnding of low returns to high
school education among migrants from surveyed villages.
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University.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Throughout the developing world, promoting higher levels of educational attainment and improving
education quality ﬁgure prominently among priorities of policy makers. The focus on improving
educational attainment is well-founded: a substantial body of research conﬁrms the beneﬁts of
human capital accumulation for long-run economic growth, and emphasizes the contribution of ed-
ucational attainment to higher wages and the improvement of other human development outcomes.
However, the decision to enroll a child in school will be inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial constraints that af-
fect a family’s ability to cover education-related costs, by the opportunity cost of attending school,
and by the expected returns to investment in education. If new oﬀ-farm opportunities develop and
wages for unskilled labor increase as economies grow, families may ﬁnd that the costs dominate the
real or perceived returns to further schooling. New wage-earning opportunities may lower poverty
incidence and improve household welfare in the short-term, but worsen distributional outcomes in
the long-term as families in poor areas choose employment over investment in education.1 Un-
derstanding how new opportunity in oﬀ-farm labor markets aﬀects family educational investment
decisions is important for policy makers charged with considering appropriate subsidies for tuitions
and other costs associated with diﬀerent levels of schooling.
In this paper we examine how changing opportunities in the migrant labor market aﬀect the
decisions of families in rural China to enroll middle school graduates in high school. Whereas middle
school completion is mandated by policy in China (Tsang, 1996), high school education is neither
compulsory nor heavily subsidized in rural areas. High school tuitions can be a substantial share
of household annual income, and credit constrained families may be unable to enroll children in
school. Increasing wealth associated with migrant or other oﬀ-farm employment opportunities may
ease credit constraints and lead to higher enrollment rates (Edmonds, 2004; Glewwe and Jacoby,
2004). In addition, if returns to high school education either locally (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1996)
or in migrant destinations (Kochar, 2004) are increasing then we might expect to ﬁnd increases in
the probability that families will enroll children in high school.
In China, improved migrant opportunities reduce the eﬀect of credit constraints on high school
1The trade oﬀ between short-run beneﬁts of wage employment to poor households (who potentially face credit
constraints) and long-run beneﬁts associated with educational investment has been emphasized recently by Rosenzweig
(2003) and Glewwe and Jacoby (1998).
1enrollment, but they also raise the net return to migrant employment and therefore the opportunity
cost of remaining in school. In this paper, we ﬁnd that a decline in the cost of participating in
migrant employment leads to a decrease in the probability that children will attend high school
in rural China. The magnitude of the estimated eﬀects are fairly large, and can be explained
by increases in oﬀ-farm opportunities in migrant destinations with referral through the migrant
network. The eﬀect is plausibly reinforced by higher returns to local wage employment in home
communities as the size of the local labor force declines through out-migration.
One drawback to much of the literature on the eﬀects of migration on source communities in
China is that migrant opportunity is diﬃcult to identify in a clean and convincing way. An impor-
tant contribution of the paper lies in the development of an instrumental variables approach that
may be useful for identifying the impact of migration on a range of outcomes in source communities
in rural China. We use a reform in the residential registration system that made it easier for rural
migrants with national identiﬁcation cards (IDs) to live legally in cities after 1988. National IDs
had not been distributed to all rural counties as of 1988, and we exploit diﬀerences in the timing
of access to IDs to identify the cost of migrating to cities. We assume that the size of the village
migrant network living in cities is related to the time since residents of a county received IDs. We
show that the instrument is both related to the size of the migrant network from a village and
plausibly exogenous to the school enrollment decision.
After showing the negative impact of migrant opportunity on high school enrollment, we examine
economic channels through which this eﬀect operates. We estimate migrant labor wage regressions
and show that returns to a year of schooling in the migrant labor market are indeed positive but
nonlinear: returns to elementary and middle school are positive and signiﬁcant, but point estimates
of returns to a year of high school are low and do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from zero. Finally, a larger
migrant network outside villages implies a smaller labor force. Thus, with the expanding migrant
labor market, the opportunity cost of high school may rise both because the net return from migrant
employment is increasing and because depletion of the local labor market with migration leads to
an increase in returns to relatively unskilled employment locally. We ﬁnd that as the size of the
migrant labor network increases, the probability that high school age children are employed in
either the migrant or local oﬀ-farm employment also increases.
2The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide background on rural-urban
migration in China and on the demographic and educational proﬁle of rural migrants from other
research and data sources. We next introduce the data sources that we will use for our analyses and
provide descriptive evidence on cohort trends in educational attainment and age of ﬁrst-time out-
migrants. Section 3 brieﬂy discusses theoretical background, and section 4 introduces our empirical
strategy. In section 5, we present our results and robustness checks, and section 6 concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
Rural-Urban Migration in China
During the 1990s, China’s labor market experienced a dramatic change with rapid growth in
the volume of rural migrants moving to urban areas for employment. Estimates using the one
percent sample from the 1990 and 2000 rounds of the Population Census and the 1995 one percent
population survey suggest that the inter-county migrant population grew from just over 20 million
in 1990 to 45 million in 1995 and 79 million by 2000 (Liang and Ma, 2004). Surveys conducted
by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Ministry of Agriculture include more detailed
retrospective information on past short-term migration, and suggest even higher levels of labor
migration than those reported in the census (Cai, Park and Zhao, 2004).
Before labor mobility restrictions were relaxed, households in remote regions of rural China faced
low returns to local economic activity, raising the possibility that they were stuck in geographic
poverty traps (Jalan and Ravallion, 2002). A considerable body of evidence suggests that the growth
and scale of rural migrant ﬂows in China make migrant opportunity an important mechanism for
poverty reduction in China. Studies of the impact of migration on source communities suggest
that opportunities to migrate are contributing to growth in rural incomes (Taylor, Rozelle and de
Brauw, 2003), easing problems of risk-coping and risk-management (Du, Park and Wang, 2004;
Giles, 2005; Giles and Yoo, 2005), and possibly leading to higher levels of local investment in
productive activities (Zhao, 2003).
Institutional changes, policy signals and the high return to labor in urban areas each played a
role in the expansion of migration during the 1990s. An early reform of the household registration
3(hukou) system in 1988 ﬁrst established a mechanism for rural migrants to obtain legal temporary
residence in China’s urban areas (Mallee, 1995). In order to take advantage of this policy change,
rural residents required a national identity card to obtain a legal temporary worker card (zanzu
zheng), but not all rural counties had distributed IDs as of 1988.2 As China recovered from its post-
Tiananmen retrenchment, some credit a series of policy speeches made by Deng Xiaoping in 1992
as signaling renewed openness toward the marketization of the economy, including employment of
migrant rural labor in urban areas (Chan and Zhang, 1999). Combined with economic expansion,
these institutional and policy changes led to increased demand for construction and service sector
workers, and catalyzed the growth in rural-urban migration that continued throughout the 1990s.
The use of migrant networks and employment referral in urban areas are important dimensions
of China’s rural-urban migration experience. Rozelle et al (1999) emphasize that villages with
more migrants in 1988 experienced more rapid migration growth by 1995. Zhao (2003) shows that
number of early migrants from a village is correlated with the probability that an individual with
no prior migration experience will choose to participate in the migrant labor market. Meng (2000)
further suggests that variation in the size of migrant ﬂows to diﬀerent destinations can be partially
explained by the size of the existing migrant population in potential destinations.3
Additional descriptive evidence from a survey of migrants living in cities underscores the likely
importance of migrant networks in lowering the cost of ﬁnding employment in urban areas. In Table
1 we present descriptive evidence from a survey of rural migrants conducted in ﬁve of China’s largest
cities in late 2001.4 More than half of the rural migrants in the urban survey secured employment
2L e g a lt e m p o r a r yr e s i d e n c es t a t u sd o e sn o tc o n f e ra c c e s st ot h es a m es e to fb e n e ﬁts (e.g., subsidized education,
health care, and housing) typically associated with permanent registration as a city resident.
3Referral through one’s social network is a common method of job search in both the developing and developed
world. Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishnawath (1996) explicitly show that in a model of migration, moving costs
can decline with the number of migrants over time, even if wage diﬀerentials narrow between source communities
and destinations. Survey-based evidence suggests that roughly 50 percent of new jobs in the US are found through
referrals facilitated by social networks (Montgomery, 1991). In a study of Mexican migrants in the US, Munshi
(2003) shows that having more migrants from one’s own village living in the same city increases the likelihood of
employment.
4We use the migrant sub-sample of the China Urban Labor Survey (CULS), which was conducted in late 2001 by
the Institute for Population and Labor Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS-IPLE) working in
collaboration with local National Bureau of Statistics Survey Teams. Researchers from Michigan State University and
the University of Michigan collaborated in funding, designing, implementing and monitoring the survey. Using the
2 0 0 0P o p u l a t i o nC e n s u sa sag u i d e ,n e i g h b o r h o o d sw e r es e l e c ted using a proportional population sampling procedure.
Sample frames were then assembled from residents’ committee records of migrant households, and public security
bureau records of migrants living on construction sites. Very short-term migrants are unlikely to have made it into
the sample frame.
4before their ﬁrst migration experience, and more than 90 percent moved to an urban area where
an acquaintance from their home village lived. Notably, before migrating over half of migrants
surveyed had a member of their extended family living in the city, and over 65 percent knew
hometown acquaintances other than a family member in the city.5
The Rural Educational System and the Age and Educational Attainment of Rural-Urban Migrants
In rural China, education became compulsory through middle school after passage of the Law
on Compulsory Education in 1986 (Tsang, 1996). In practice, some rural areas took consider-
able time to meet this standard, and many rural areas still provide only ﬁve years of elementary
education instead of the mandated six years. Thus, children completing middle school in some
rural areas have eight years of formal schooling, while in other areas a middle school graduate has
nine years of education. After middle school, children may take admissions tests for academic or
vocational-technical high schools, but families of students who pass examinations are required to
pay substantial tuition before they can enroll.
Prior research on rural-urban migrants has found a positive correlation between years of school-
ing and the ability to participate in migrant labor markets.6 Much of this research has been
conducted in China’s poorer areas (e.g., Du, Park and Wang, 2004), where educational attainment
often falls short of compulsory education through middle school (Brown and Park, 2002). Therefore
these studies may pick up the eﬀect of completing additional years of middle school on the ability
to migrate. Descriptive information on migrants in CULS cities reinforces the idea that migrants
do not require high school education to ﬁnd employment in urban areas (Table 2, Panel A). Of the
rural-urban migrants surveyed in the CULS, nearly 82 percent had a middle school education or
less. While migrants with a high school education may earn higher wages, it is not evident that
high school graduation is necessary to ﬁnd a job as a migrant. If a bias exists in the CULS, it
picks up more educated migrants who are successful at ﬁnding employment in larger cities and
have established a stable long-term residence. The CULS data are consistent with information on
interprovincial migration from the 1990 and 2000 Population Census (Table 2, Panel B). Over 75
5Categories of acquaintance type shown in Table 1 are not exclusive because many migrants were preceded to
cities by both family members and other hometown acquaintances.
6More generally, Yang (2004) ﬁnds that prior household educational attainment helped to facilitate the adjustment
to use of goods and factor markets during transition.
5percent of migrants from RCRE provinces have a middle school education or less. This ﬁgure does
not provide a clear picture of the share of rural migrants with a middle school education or less,
as the Census data pool urban and rural migrants and therefore include a large number of college
educated, urban-urban migrants. Nonetheless, the data sets conﬁrm that though some education
may be useful for migration, education beyond middle school may not be necessary for most jobs
in which migrants are employed.
Evidence on Educational Attainment and Age of Migration from the RCRE Supplemental Survey
For our primary analysis, we use household and village surveys conducted in ﬁfty-two villages
of four provinces from August to October 2004 in collaboration with the Research Center for Rural
Economy (RCRE) at the Ministry of Agriculture. All 3999 households in the most recent wave of
RCRE’s panel for these four provinces were enumerated, allowing us to match villages and house-
holds from the 2004 supplemental survey with a historical panel of villages and households that
RCRE has surveyed annually from 1986 to 2003.7 One unique feature of the supplemental survey
is that education level, birth year, current occupations, work and migration history and residence
locations were enumerated for all children and other current and former residents (including de-
ceased former residents) of households in the survey. This survey design eliminates the selection
bias that would occur if household survey data with only current household residents were used to
study educational attainment.
We summarize diﬀerent aspects of educational attainment by cohort in Figures 1 through 3 for
individuals born after 1940 and residing (or previously residing) in RCRE households. The RCRE
supplemental survey data suggest that cohorts from RCRE villages have educational attainment
levels consistent with those found in the census.8 Educational attainment is rising over time, and
the educational attainment of girls and boys converges by the 1975 birth cohort.
In the RCRE survey, summary statistics on the age of ﬁrst migration are consistent with surveys
of migrants in urban areas. Between 1987 and 2004 the number of migrants of all ages increased
7A detailed discussion of a larger nine-province sample from the RCRE panel dataset, including discussions of
survey protocol, sampling, attrition, and comparisons with other data sources from rural China, can be found in the
data appendix of Benjamin, Brandt and Giles (2005). This paper makes use of village and household data from the
four provinces where the authors conducted a follow-up survey, which are Shanxi, Jiangsu, Anhui and Henan.
8See Hannum et al (2004) for a discussion of evidence on rural educational attainment using information from the
2000 Population Census.
6while the average age of ﬁrst migration remained fairly constant at 20 years of age (Figure 4).
Individuals over 30 or 35, however, might reasonably be considered outliers who keep the average
age of migration constant when it would otherwise decline due to increasing migration among
teenagers. Figure 5 shows lowess estimates of the share of three teen cohorts engaged in temporary
or long-term migrant employment outside of their home counties. While it is clear that the share
of 15 and 16 year olds in migrant employment is increasing, the rate of increase does not appear
dramatic, and the level of migration is low enough that it would not necessarily require a decline
in high school enrollment. The shares of 17 and 18 year olds and 19 and 20 year olds working in
migrant jobs are increasing at a much faster rate. It is important to note that these eﬀects are
averaged across individuals in many villages, and once we control for village ﬁxed eﬀects in our
analyses the increase in teenagers migrating for employment reasons may be substantial in some
villages. Given that much migration occurs after employment has been secured through referral,
it is also possible that potential migrants go through a period of waiting after completion of middle
school before departing to work in an urban area.
3 Theoretical Framework
Below we present a simple model to frame the potential eﬀects of expanding migrant opportunity
on the decision to enroll a child in high school. The model illustrates the relationship between the
cost of participating in migrant labor markets, expected returns to high school attainment, and the
opportunity cost of schooling, as credit constraints are eased. We focus our discussion of the model
on the high school enrollment decision.9
Assume that in each period households may choose to invest in human capital, Ht, and physical
capital Kt used in agricultural or non-agricultural household self-employment activity. Human
capital is accumulated when a child attends school for et share of his or her time during the year,
with a cost of Pe
t for tuition, books, supplies, and other costs associated with schooling. The
household accumulates human capital according to:
9Glewwe and Jacoby (2004) and Kochar (2004) both present models with these basic features. We follow Glewwe
and Jacoby in our derivation but allow for the possibility of migrant wage employment where returns in the migrant
market are dependent on size of the village migrant network and accumulated human capital.
7Ht+1 = Ht + ψtG(et) (1)
where G is a concave production function and ψt is a learning productivity parameter reﬂecting
school quality, child ability and factors that aﬀect the motivation and eﬀort of the child.
Households earn income from some or all of the following activities: agricultural production,
non-agricultural self-employment and employment in migrant labor markets. Home production
may utilize physical capital and labor of both children and adults, yh
t = θtF
¡
Kt,L a1
t ,L c1
t
¢
,w h e r e
θt is a multiplicative productivity shock with a mean of one, Kt is the current stock of capital, and
La1
t and Lc1
t are adult and child labor used in self-employment activities, respectively. Household
income from the migrant labor market will be ym
t = w(Ha
t ,M jt)La2
t + w(Hc
t,M jt)Lc2
t ,w h e r eLa2
t
and Lc2
t are adult and child labor used in migrant employment, and w(Ha
t ,M jt) and w(Hc
t,M jt) are
the wages that can be earned in the migrant labor market by adults and older children, respectively.
We treat wages in the migrant market as net returns to the household from migrant employment,
and are a function of human capital, Ha
t and Hc
t,a n dt h ee ﬀect of the migrant network, Mjt,f r o m
village j on the cost of migrating.10 We assume that as Mjt increases, the cost of migrating falls.
The household will thus accumulate physical capital according to
Kt+1 = Kt + θtF
¡
Kt,L a1
t ,L c1
t
¢
+ w(Ha
t ,M jt)La2
t + w(Hc
t,M jt)Lc2
t − ct − Pe
t et (2)
We further restrict Kt,K t+1 ≥ 0, which amounts to a credit constraint that aﬀects the ability of
the household to borrow against future income for current expenditures on consumption, tuition
and education related expenses.
Households have a given number of school-age children at time t =0 .F r o m p e r i o d s t =0to
t = T − 1 children are eligible for school. In period T and beyond, children are no longer eligible
for school and returns to educational investment through period T are realized. We assume that if
school age children are employed in farm production or oﬀ-farm activities, they perform unskilled
tasks for which human capital is unimportant. The utility of human and physical capital stocks
10The migrant network may inﬂuence net income from migration by both lowering the cost of migration and by
facilitating matches to higher quality jobs. These eﬀects will be observationally indistinguishable, as they both raise
the net return to participating in the migrant labor market.
8accumulated by period T over the remaining life of the household can be written as a terminal
value function, Φ(KT,H T), which represents the uncertain future utility of the household and
incorporates expected consumption and ﬁnancial beneﬁts from educated children. Current utility
is an additively separable concave function of consumption ct, the leisure of adults and children
(la
t =1− La1
t − La2
t and lc
t =1− Lc1
t − Lc2
t , respectively) and the current school enrollment of a
school-age child, et. The household’s objective function is to maximize
E0
"
T−1 X
t=0
δtU (ct,la
t,lc
t,e t)+Φ(KT,H T)
#
(3)
subject to equations (1) and (2) and the borrowing constraint, where δt is the subjective discount
factor and E0 is the expectations operator. Households are uncertain about future values of ψt,
θt, w(·,·), Pe
t ,a n dΦ.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior solution are:
Uc (t)=λt (4)
Ula (t)=λt
³
θtFLa1
t (t)+w(Ha
t ,M jt)
´
(5)
Ulc (t)=λt
³
θtFLc1
t (t)+w(Hc
t,M jt)
´
(6)
Ue (t)+µtψtGe (t)=λt
³
θtFLc1
t (t)+w(Hc
t,M jt) − Pe
t
´
(7)
where µt and λt are time-varying shadow values of physical and human capital that will be scaled
by the discount factor, δt. Solving the system of equations yields an enrollment demand function
of the form:
E∗
t = E∗
³
λt,µ t,ψ t,θ tFLc1
t (t),θ tFLa1
t (t),w(Ha
t ,M jt),w(Hc
t,M jt),Pe
t
´
(8)
9Because preferences are additively separable, current period decisions depend on past decisions and
expected future prices only through the shadow prices of physical and human capital, µt and λt.
Further, after controlling for λt, the borrowing constraint will only inﬂuence intertemporal decisions
through the intertemporal Euler equation and have no aﬀect on intratemporal decisions.
Using equations (4)-(7), we can trace out the potential eﬀect of an increase in the village migrant
labor network, Mjt, on high school enrollment decisions. First, since income earned in the oﬀ-farm
market will increase, the shadow price of physical assets, λt, will fall. The wealth eﬀect eases
credit constraints associated with paying high school tuition, and may facilitate school high school
enrollment.
Second, an increase in Mjt aﬀects the shadow price of human capital, µt. The shadow price
can be thought of as the expected “return to schooling,” since the terminal condition requires that
µT = ∂Φ
∂HT , and it can be shown that µt = µT. The actual functional form of the terminal condition
will aﬀect whether or not the return to schooling rises with human capital investment. If ∂w
∂Hc
t > 0
and is of signiﬁcant magnitude when children complete middle school, the return to schooling will
be positive.11
The third and fourth eﬀects of an increase in the village migrant network size operate through
the shadow prices of adult and child time. Since w will increase with an increase in Mjt, the net
income potentially earned in the migrant market given the child’s current stock of human capital
also increases. Therefore the value of the child’s time increases, decreasing the likelihood of further
school enrollment. An increase in Mjt also raises the value of parent time in the migrant labor
market and has a cross-price eﬀect in equation (8) that is diﬃcult to sign. The net eﬀect of migrant
opportunity on high school enrollment is a combination of all four of these eﬀects and cannot be
signed a priori.
We further simplify the enrollment demand functions that we will estimate by recognizing
that farm productivity will be a function of potentially time varying household endowments and
other characteristics, Xht,t h a ta ﬀect wealth and family preferences for education. Among these
characteristics are parent human capital, which also aﬀect the potential returns that parents may
earn both in the labor market and through household activities. We thus simplify the enrollment
11As we will see below, this is an empirical matter and may be inﬂuenced by the nature of institutions that aﬀect
the segmentation of rural and urban laborers in China’s cities.
10demand function to:
E∗
t = E∗ (λt,µ t,ψ t,θ t,Xht,M jt,Pe
t ) (9)
where enrollment demand is now a function of the shadow price of physical assets, the expected
return to schooling (or shadow price of schooling), child ability, productivity shocks, household
endowments and characteristics, migrant opportunity as proxied by the size of the village migrant
network, and the tuition and other costs associated with high school enrollment.
4 Empirical Methodology
To understand how migrant opportunity aﬀects the decision to enroll middle school graduates in
high school, we need to control for such factors as lifetime wealth, preferences, prices and unobserved
ability that might covary with the probability of school enrollment and oﬀ-farm opportunities. From
arguments of the enrollment demand function in equation (9), a reduced form model of the discrete
decision of household h to enroll child i in high school can be written:
Eit = β0 + β1Mjt + Z0
jtβ2 + X0
htβ3 + uj + vt + νi + eihjt (10)
where Eit is 1 if an individual completing middle school in year t e n r o l l si nh i g hs c h o o li ny e a r
t+1,a n d0o t h e r w i s e .Mjt is the number of village residents with employment as migrants outside
the home county, and proxies for size of the migrant network. Zjt are other time-varying village
characteristics that potentially aﬀect local returns to high school education and alternative activities
(the shadow value of schooling, µt,i ne q u a t i o n( 9 ) ) ,a n dl o c a lf a c t o r si n ﬂuencing credit constraints
faced by all households. Household characteristics, Xht, are introduced in some models to control
for family preferences for education, factors aﬀecting lifetime household wealth, and the likelihood
that the household faces credit constraints. Some important village characteristics, like location,
do not vary over time but have considerable inﬂuence over both labor market returns and the
cost of obtaining education, and so we include uj, a vector of village ﬁxed eﬀects, in all models.
Price levels, macroeconomic shocks and trends can also aﬀect family income, the cost of education,
and the demand for migrant labor, and we control for these eﬀects with year dummy variables,
11vt. The ability of individual middle school graduates, νi, is unobserved but important for high
school enrollment decisions, and reﬂects the education productivity parameter, ψt,i ne q u a t i o n( 9 )
above. In particular, students must test into high schools and it is likely that examinations are
more competitive in settings where the local supply of spaces in high school is more constrained.
In models that include household information, we include the parents’ years of schooling as proxies
for dimensions of ability picked up from the family, but other dimensions will remain unobserved.
In order to identify the impact of migrant opportunity on enrollment decisions, instruments for
endogenous migrant network size must be plausibly unrelated to unobserved individual ability.
We assume an error term, eihjt, that allows for correlation of errors among individuals from the
same village, but is independent across village clusters. Although we only observe individuals in
the year that a family makes a decision about high school enrollment, the decisions are made at
diﬀerent points in time from 1986 to 2003. Village migrant network size, time-varying village eﬀects
and instruments for migrant network size all have a village level time component. Correlation in
the errors with which these variables are measured can introduce correlation in the error term, and
so our estimator must allow for correlation of errors within the village.12
Since Eit is a binary variable, one might consider using a non-linear model such as a probit
to estimate equation (10). However, we are concerned with the endogeneity of migrant network
size, Mjt, and implementing an “instrumental variables” probit estimator requires uncomfortable
joint normality assumptions about the error terms. We choose to work with the linear probability
model because it allows us to implement a linear instrumental variables estimator, and the mean
conditional probability that a middle school graduate will enroll in high school is nearly 0.5. In
this situation the marginal eﬀects are unlikely to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those calculated from a
probit.13
We use an instrumental variables generalized method of moments (IV-GMM) estimator to obtain
eﬃcient estimates of (10) while allowing for correlation within village clusters. For computational
purposes, we control for village ﬁxed eﬀects by calculating village means for all variables and then
12Kedzi (2003) emphasizes the importance of calculating standard errors robust to serial correlation of errors in
ﬁxed eﬀects models. Bertrand, Duﬂo and Mullainathan (2004) show that failure to consider serial correlation in
diﬀerences-in-diﬀe r e n c e sa n a l y s e sm a yl e a dt oe s t i m a t e so fs t a n d a r de r r o r st h a ta r et o os m a l l .
13Nonetheless, we estimated equation (10) using an instrumental variables probit model (Rivers and Vuong, 1988),
and the signs and statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated marginal eﬀects are consistent with the coeﬃcients on linear
probability models that we present here.
12demeaning. We then follow a procedure outlined in Wooldridge (2002, p. 193) to obtain consistent
coeﬃcient estimates and estimates of the variance-covariance matrix robust to arbitrary forms of
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Identiﬁcation Strategy
Estimating equation (10) using OLS would almost certainly introduce endogeneity bias because
our proxy for the migrant network reﬂects factors that inﬂuence both the demand for and supply
of migrants from the village. A persistent disruption to the local economy, for example, could limit
the ability of parents to cover tuition costs while raising the relative return to migrant employ-
ment in more distant destinations, inducing a negative relationship. On the other hand, positive
correlation between migrant network size and unobservables aﬀecting high school enrollment could
exist if increases in household wealth or expanded high school capacity (and lower test scores for
competitive admission) occurred simultaneously with growing access to migrant employment. To
identify the eﬀect of the migrant network and the higher net return from migration that comes
with referral, we must ﬁnd an instrumental variable that is correlated with the share of migrants
living outside the village but unrelated to unobserved individual, household and community factors
aﬀecting high school enrollment.
We make use of two policy changes that, working together, aﬀect the strength of migrant
networks outside home counties, but are plausibly unrelated to the demand and supply for schooling.
First, a new national ID card (shenfen zheng) was introduced in 1984. While urban residents
received IDs in 1984, residents of most rural counties did not immediately receive IDs. In 1988,
a reform of the residential registration system made it easier for migrants to gain legal temporary
residence in cities, but a national ID card was necessary to obtain a temporary residence permit
(Mallee, 1995). While some rural counties made national IDs available to rural residents as early
as 1984, others distributed them in 1988, and still others did not issue IDs until several years later.
The RCRE follow-up survey asked local oﬃcials when ID cards had actually been issued to rural
residents of the county. In our sample, about half of the counties issued cards in 1988 (25 of 52),
but cards were issued as early as 1984 in one village and as late as 1996 in another. It should be
emphasized that ID cards were not necessary for migration, and large numbers of migrants live in
cities without legal temporary residence cards. However, migrants with temporary residence cards
13have a more secure position in the destination community, hold better jobs, and make up part of
the long-term migrant network within a city. Migrant networks take time to build up and time-
since-IDs-were-issued has an apparent non-linear relationship with the size of the migrant network.
We experimented with quadratic, cubic and quartic functions of time-since-IDs-issued, and settle
on the quartic function for our instruments because we ﬁnd it ﬁts the pattern of expanding migrant
networks better than the quadratic or the cubic functions.
Though this policy change is plausibly exogenous to schooling decisions, it does not provide us
with an ideal identiﬁcation strategy. In a perfect world, a randomly implemented policy would exist
that aﬀected the ability to migrate from some counties but not others. As the distribution of ID
cards was not necessarily random, we must be concerned that counties with speciﬁc characteristics
were singled out to receive ID cards earlier than other counties, or that features of counties receiving
IDs earlier are systematically correlated with trends in educational attainment.14
In order to assess the possibility of endogenous placement bias in the distribution of ID cards,
to control for this endogeneity, and then to determine the likelihood that our results are biased by
endogenous placement, we proceed as follows. First, we split the sample into early, middle and late
adopters and examine lowess plots and average characteristics across groups to identify obvious
evidence of bias. Next, in our estimation we include village ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved
village characteristics that may lead to endogenous placement, and check the robustness of our
results to inclusion of additional time-varying village variables that proxy for time-varying village
level unobservables that may be related to the timing of ID card distribution. Finally, we perform
a Hahn-Hausman test (Hahn and Hausman 2002). If our estimates fail the Hahn-Hausman test,
one possible implication would be that our instruments are correlated with the unobservables in
equation (10). In the remainder of this section, we present descriptive evidence that is largely
supportive of our identiﬁcation strategy. In our discussion of results in section 5, we assess the
robustness of our estimates and perform the Hahn-Hausman test.
The Plausibility of the Years-Since-ID Instrument
To evaluate the plausibility of using years-since-ID-card-distribution as an instrument, we ﬁrst
categorize villages as receiving cards prior to 1988, in 1988, or after 1988, and look for signiﬁcant
14The new ID card was implemented by provincial oﬃces of the Ministry of Civil Aﬀairs.
14diﬀerences in observable average village characteristics measured in 1988 (Table 3). Although some
diﬀerences appear between early and late villages, few are statistically signiﬁcant. For example,
although early adopters were more likely to be near cities, they were not all near cities. The only
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence at the ten percent level was between mean income per capita in
villages receiving ID cards before 1988 and other villages.
Even if villages that issued ID cards early are not observably diﬀerent than other villages,
one should be concerned that the timing of ID card receipt was endogenous. Local demand for
migration may have led county oﬃcials to issue ID cards in response to a sharp rise in migration
from the village, and in this case, issuing ID cards would have little to do with new migration,
but may have simply been correlated with migration ﬂows already occurring. To consider whether
demand for migration drove distribution of IDs, we plot the log number of migrants in the village
workforce against the years since ID cards were issued (Figure 6). The lowess plot through the data
indicates that migration appears to rise immediately after or as ID cards are issued, accelerates
and then slows to a plateau about 10 years after ID cards are issued. To ensure that our results are
not driven by the twenty-ﬁve counties receiving IDs in 1988, we plot the ﬁgure with these villages
r e m o v e di nF i g u r e7 .
Finally, one might worry that our instruments are correlated with diﬀering trends in enrollment
prior to distribution of IDs. To examine whether enrollment trends obviously diﬀered prior to ID
distribution, we plot the share of individuals entering high school who are of age to do so by birth
year cohort and by the timing of ID card distribution in the county (Figure 8). We ﬁnd that in
general there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in trends prior to the 1973 birth cohort, whose parents
would have been making the high school enrollment decision around 1988. We also plot the same
ﬁgure conditional on middle school completion (Figure 9), and again ﬁnd no apparent diﬀerences
in trends prior to the 1973 birth cohort. Note, however, that in villages receiving IDs after 1988,
enrollment growth in high school was faster for birth cohorts after 1973 than in those villages with
IDs by 1988. Considering the long-term growth in incomes in rural China, this pattern is consistent
with a positive wealth eﬀect dominating in villages with smaller oﬀ-farm migrant networks.
The Timing of the High School Enrollment Decision
In order to estimate equation (10) we need to make two ﬁnal assumptions about the timing of
15school enrollment and years of primary school. Although the supplementary survey implemented
by RCRE provides us with an individual’s age and years of schooling completed by 2004, we do not
know the precise age at which each individual started school. To inform our assumption about the
age at which children enter school, we use a survey conducted by the Center for Chinese Agricultural
Policy (CCAP) in late 2000.15 In addition to explicit questions about educational attainment, the
CCAP survey asked speciﬁcally about the age at which individuals entered and left school. We ﬁnd
that among individuals aged 16 to 34, a slight majority of children began school at age 7 (Table
4). Therefore we assume that individuals begin school at age 7, and test whether our results are
robust to this assumption.16
To construct our sample, we have to make one more assumption. In some parts of rural China,
primary school lasts ﬁve years, whereas in other places primary school lasts six years. The sup-
plemental survey did not directly ask whether villages in the RCRE survey have ﬁve or six year
primary schools. However, when we examine completed years of schooling at the village level, it is
fairly straightforward to discern whether completed schooling patterns are consistent with ﬁve or
six year primary schools. We found that in some villages most children completed 6, 9 or 12 years
of school; as middle and high school each last three years, and these patterns were consistent with
six year primary schools. In other villages, most children completed 5, 8, or 11 years of schooling,
consistent with ﬁve year primary schools.17 Using this information, we coded all of the villages as
ﬁve or six year primary school villages. To illustrate our assumption, we show average enrollment
rates for each grade level in ﬁve and six year primary school villages conditional on completing
the previous grade (Table 5). The most signiﬁcant decision is clearly either the decision to move
from grade 8 to grade 9 (in ﬁve year villages) or from grade 9 to grade 10 (in six year villages).
We measure the decision to enroll in high school with a variable that includes the decision to enter
grade 10 conditional on completing grade 9 for six year primary school villages and the decision to
enter grade 9 conditional on completing grade 8 for ﬁve year primary school villages.18
15See de Brauw et al (2002) for a description of the CCAP survey.
16We tested whether our main results are robust to this assumption by assuming that children enter school at
either age 6 or age 8, and found that the signs and relative magnitudes of our main results did not change.
17In the one village in which our method was indeterminate, we assume that the village has a ﬁve year primary
school. Our results are robust to recoding the village as one with a six year primary school.
18All of our estimation results are robust to studying the grade 9 enrollment decision conditional on grade 8
completion, as well as to analyzing the grade 10 enrollment decision conditional on grade 8 completion.
16One ﬁnal concern may involve the way that repeats or skipped grades are handled. Although
the supplemental survey did not ask explicitly about repeats or skips, the protocol for the sup-
plemental survey required respondents to report years of schooling completed and the common
interpretation is to answer in terms of the level of schooling completed. Examination of the CCAP
data, which asked explicitly about skips and repeats, suggests their inclusion does not aﬀect the
general distribution of educational attainment. Therefore our ﬁndings should be robust to any
errors in the measurement of schooling attainment.
5R e s u l t s
The First-Stage
Before estimating equation (10), we ﬁrst establish that our instruments, a polynomial function
of the years since ID cards were issued in the county, are signiﬁcantly related to size of the migrant
labor force. We ﬁrst estimate the relationship as a quadratic, cubic, and quartic function of the
years since IDs were issued (Table 6, columns 1a through 1c), with only year and village dummies
as controls. Even after controlling for economic growth and macroeconomic shocks, we ﬁnd a
strong relationship between years-since-IDs were distributed and the size of the migrant network,
regardless of speciﬁcation. We favor the quartic function for the remainder of our estimation for
two reasons. First, it allows for the most ﬂexibility in determining the eﬀects of ID card distribution
on the migrant network.19 Second, the partial R2 increases signiﬁcantly from the quadratic to the
quartic, which reduces the potential for bias in instrumental variables regression.20
In most of the remainder of our regressions, we control for several village economic conditions
that vary over time. The vector Zvt in models 2 through 5 includes economic indicators controlling
for wealth, the local agricultural environment, potential credit constraints and size of the local
market. To control for the average village wealth level, we include the logarithm of average income
per capita. To control for opportunity costs in agriculture, we include the average land per capita
and the share of land in the village that is cultivable. The cultivable land Gini coeﬃcient controls for
19The quartic was ﬁrst favored in studies of empirical age earnings proﬁl e sa sf a rl e s sr e s t r i c t i v et h a nt h et y p i c a l
second order polynomial in age (Murphy and Welch, 1990).
20Since the bias in instrumental variables estimation is inversely proportional to the partial R
2,ah i g h e rp a r t i a l
R
2 also implies lower bias so long as each additional instrument is strongly correlated with the endogenous variable.
17underlying inequality in the village and may aﬀect credit constraints in the informal credit market.21
Alternatively, a measure of within village inequality may pick up diﬀerences across villages in the
willingness to provide local public goods, like an elementary school, that are correlated also with
likelihood of testing into high school. Finally, to control for the size of markets within the village,
we include the size of the village labor force.
Because we are concerned about introducing unobservable heterogeneity into our models from
individual or household level variables in our second stage, we next include only the village level
controls in the ﬁrst stage (Table 6, column 2). We again ﬁnd that the instruments jointly have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of migrants from the village; in this case, the F-statistic is 10.06.
As we add the individual and household level controls (models 3 through 5) to pick up eﬀects of
average village-wide variation in these variables, the instruments remain jointly signiﬁcant, with
F-statistics that range between 9.98 and 10.19.22
The Eﬀect of Migrant Networks on High School Enrollment
We initially investigate the relationship between migrant opportunity and high school enrollment
by estimating equation (10) using OLS with village demeaned data to control for ﬁxed eﬀects
and year dummies (Table 7, column 0). We estimate a coeﬃcient of −0.001 on the migration
opportunity variable, and the estimate is not statistically diﬀerent than zero. Without controlling
for the endogeneity of migration, there seems to be no relationship between high school enrollment
and migration. However, factors such as expanded capacity in high schools or a decline in the cost of
attending high schools through improved roads and public transportation may well be endogenous
with factors simultaneously lower the cost of participating in the oﬀ-farm market.23
When we estimate the determinants of high-school enrollment after controlling for the endogene-
ity of migration, we ﬁnd that the number of migrants from the village has a negative, statistically
21Under some assumptions, a higher Gini coeﬃcient would be correlated with more severe constraints on access to
credit. Banerjee and Newman (1993), for example, provide a model suggesting that underlying wealth distribution
and the nature of credit constraints may have an impact on occupational choice.
22Our dependent variable and many regressors for the ﬁrst stage are at the village-level, and some readers may
prefer to assess signiﬁcance of our instruments in a village level regression. In Appendix Table A.2, we reproduce
Table 6 for corresponding models in which each observation represents a village-year average.
23In Appendix Table A.1, we present descriptive statistics for all variables used in our estimation. These descriptive
statistics show average characteristics for individuals completing middle school and making the decision whether or
not to enter high school in the following year. We show averages over all years and selected years in three year
intervals.
18signiﬁcant eﬀect on high school enrollment (Table 7, columns 1 through 5). Holding only village
and year eﬀects constant, an additional ten migrants from a village is associated with a 2.9 percent
decrease in the probability that an individual graduating from middle school will enroll in high
school in the following year. The estimate is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. As migration
networks increase in strength, the net return to migrating and the opportunity cost of staying in
school rises enough that we observe a substantial decline in high school enrollment.
To account for time varying village economic conditions, we add the village controls to equation
( 2 )( T a b l e7 ,c o l u m n2 ) . W eﬁnd only one coeﬃcient that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero;
individuals in villages with larger labor forces are more likely to enroll in high school. Larger villages
a r em o r el i k e l yt oh a v es u p p o r t e dt h e i ro w ne l e m e n t a r ys c h o o lw h e nh i g hs c h o o la g ec h i l d r e nw e r e
younger, so children from these villages may have found it systematically less costly to obtain quality
early education when younger. The inclusion of these variables does not change our conclusion about
the association between migration opportunity and high school enrollment. In this speciﬁcation,
the estimated coeﬃcient on the number of migrants increases in absolute magnitude, now implying
that an increase of ten migrants from a village is associated with a 4.9 percent decrease in the
probability that a middle school graduate will enroll in high school. In elasticity terms, at the
mean migration network size in the sample the eﬀect of migrant opportunity on the probability
of migration is −0.441; a one percent increase in the size of the network implies that students are
0.441 percent less likely to enroll in high school.
Individual and parental characteristics may also aﬀect the decision to go to high school by
contributing to diﬀerences in levels of household wealth or family preferences for education. There-
fore, we add selected characteristics to the model (Table 7, columns 3 through 5). One might be
concerned that unobserved heterogeneity related to individual characteristics may be related to the
years since IDs became available, so we add these variables gradually while paying attention to
changes in overidentiﬁcation test statistics. First, we add gender, an indicator variable for the ﬁrst
born child to the model, and an indicator variable for households in which the ﬁrst born child was
male (column 3). We ﬁnd that gender does not aﬀect the probability of enrolling in high school.
Since educational gender gaps have been narrowing in much of rural China (e.g. Hannum, 2004),
this ﬁnding is not surprising. Whereas birth order might be a signiﬁcant determinant of educational
19attainment if parents face credit constraints, restrictions on fertility make it unsurprising that the
estimated coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst born child indicator is also statistically insigniﬁcant.
We further add parental characteristics that reﬂect innate ability, proxy for wealth, and the
ability to participate in migration, and continue to ﬁnd that migration opportunities negatively
aﬀect high school enrollment (columns 4 and 5). Both the father’s and mother’s years of schooling
have a positive eﬀect on an individual’s likelihood of attending high school (column 4). Families
with more education are likely to be wealthier, more active in encouraging the child’s study, or have
preferences for more school. We add measures of the number of potential male and female migrants
in the household (column 5), which are the number of children in the household over the age of 16,
we ﬁnd both have negative, statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on high school enrollment. When more
individuals in a household are of the age to migrate, households may have more information about
jobs and therefore be less likely to send children to high school.
Finally, we are concerned that other time-varying village characteristics that aﬀect market
development may aﬀect the relationship between migrant networks and high school enrollment
decisions. If local economic or other activities are facilitated by ID card issuance, our estimates
could be biased. For example, if IDs make it easier for local ﬁrms to trade with more distant
partners, make it easier for families to claim beneﬁts (e.g., health insurance) or register children for
school, then issuing IDs may aﬀect other activities that also have an inﬂuence on migration. Most
stories one could think of, however, are likely to bias against migration by increasing proﬁtability
of local enterprise or lowering the cost of obtaining beneﬁts locally. Furthermore, with or without
an ID migrants cannot register children for subsidized education outside of their home counties. To
account for characteristics related to market development and the local impact of state intervention,
we include another vector of time varying village level variables in our model (column 6). The
average share of grain sold at quota prices is included to pick up the extent to which grain policy is
binding in the village. Variables reﬂecting the distribution of land among diﬀerent uses other than
crop production (share of land allocated to aquaculture, the share of land allocated to forestry, and
the share of land allocated to orchards) control for the extent of specialization in and marketization
of the agricultural economy. Average household wealth per capita (housing, durable goods, savings
and other ﬁnancial wealth) provides an additional control for the average level of credit constraints,
20and ﬁnally the average proportion of households with some non-agricultural self-employment picks
up the eﬀect of local household businesses. We test the estimated coeﬃcients on these variables and
ﬁnd that we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are jointly insigniﬁcant, and further, inclusion
of these variables has no impact on the coeﬃcient on Mjt. Since inclusion of additional village
l e v e lc o n t r o l sd o e sn o ta ﬀect our coeﬃcient of interest, we believe it unlikely that time-varying
unobservables related to market development bias our results. We exclude this vector from our
remaining analyses because these variables introduce additional noise and their inclusion has no
impact on the coeﬃcient on migrant network size.
Controlling for individual characteristics, the estimated eﬀect of larger village networks does
not change. In each case, the coeﬃcient estimate is between −0.045 and −0.049,a n ds i g n i ﬁcant
at the 5 percent level. We also perform over-identiﬁcation tests on the quartic in time-since-IDs
were distributed, and results from these tests oﬀer further support that the instruments are not
systematically related to unobservables inﬂuencing both migrant opportunity and enrollment in
high school.24
Additional Robustness Checks
Before concluding that increasing migration opportunity causes a decrease in the probability of
high school enrollment, we perform a number of robustness checks on our result. First, we want to
be sure that our instruments are not weak, which could lead to diﬃculties in statistical inference.
Next, we ensure that our results are robust to the inclusion of wealth shocks.
Weak instruments aﬀect the sampling distribution of point estimates and therefore hypothesis
tests in GMM estimators (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002), so we want to ensure that our instru-
ments are not weak and that second-order bias in IV estimation can be ignored. At ﬁrst glance,
we may not have much reason for concern; the F-statistics are over 10 in most speciﬁcations of
our model. However, as discussed by Hahn and Hausman (2003), potential bias in IV estimation
is also aﬀected by correlation between the error terms in the ﬁrst and second stage equations.
As the F-test does not account for this correlation, our estimates could be substantially biased if
unobservables still exist that aﬀect both migrant networks and high school enrollment.
24To test for overidentiﬁcation, we use the Hansen J-Statistic. It is similar to the more commonly used Sargan test
but robust to heteroskedasticity (Baum, Schaﬀer, and Stillman, 2003).
21Hahn and Hausman (2002) devise an alternative to the F-test which assumes that instruments
are strong and that the second-order bias in IV estimates is zero. If the Hahn-Hausman test
is rejected, one can conclude that either the instruments are weak, or that they are correlated
with unobservables in ways that introduce bias. In a model with one endogenous variable and
strong instruments, the estimated relationship between the dependent variable and the endogenous
variable should not depend on the choice of dependent variable. Partialing out all other coeﬃcients,
the inverse of β1 is implied by the equation:
Mvt = α1Eit + uihvt (11)
where uihvt is an error term, and we test the null hypothesis that β1 = 1
α1. If the null hypothesis is
rejected, then the instruments are weak and inference using those instruments is almost certainly
incorrect.
We performed the Hahn-Hausman test using the bias corrected 2SLS estimator developed by
Donald and Newey (2001) and suggested by Hahn and Hausman as appropriate for implementation
of their test. In each speciﬁcation in Table 7, we ﬁnd that we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that the forward and reverse regressions imply the same coeﬃcient estimate.25 Therefore we can
conclude that the quartic function of the years since ID cards were issued are suﬃciently strong
instruments for the number of migrants from a village and that our estimates are unbiased.
Second, we examine the eﬀect of wealth shocks on school enrollment decisions (Table 8). One
might be concerned that, in spite of our IV strategy, unobserved wealth shocks may drive the
decisions to leave school and to participate in the migrant labor market. We add a variable
measuring village rainfall shocks lagged one year to the speciﬁcation in column 5 of Table 7 in
order to capture unexpected shocks to income and wealth.26 We also interact the rainfall shock
variables with an indicator variable for households in which the father has completed high school,
25The coeﬃcient estimated using 2SLS is nearly identical to the coeﬃcient reported from the IV-GMM estimator.
This should not be surprising as the IV-GMM estimator was used primarily to provide robust, eﬃcient estimates of
the variance-covariance matrix, whereas coeﬃcient estimates from either estimator are consistent.
26The rainfall shocks are measured as the squared county level deviation from the long-term mean rainfall between
July and November of the previous year. Giles and Yoo (2005) show that deviations in rainfall between July and
November matter most for crop production in these villages as it has a signiﬁcant impact on the following Spring’s
winter wheat crop.
22which is strongly correlated with whether or not the father holds oﬀ-farm employment, to determine
whether or not village-wide wealth shocks have diﬀerent impacts on households with and without
oﬀ-farm income (columns 2). We also test whether birth order matters, by explicitly including the
birth order (column 3) and an interaction with the ﬁrst born child indicator (column 4). We do not
ﬁnd that the father’s education matters, but we do ﬁnd that when wealth shocks are larger the ﬁrst
born is less likely to enroll in high school. In all cases, the estimated coeﬃcient on migrant network
size decreases to −0.025, but it is still signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from the coeﬃcient in our base model. Therefore we conclude that our result is robust to
the inclusion of wealth shocks.
Low Returns to High School Education in Migrant Labor Markets
In order to understand how returns in the labor market inﬂuence decisions about enrollment in
high school, we use a module added to the 2003 round of the RCRE survey designed to study the
returns in migrant labor markets. For individuals who had out-migrated from RCRE households in
2003, the RCRE survey collected information on earnings, the cost of migration and the number of
days individuals worked as migrants. Using a sample of all adult children of the household head and
spouse who were between 15 and 50 years old, we estimate the net returns to education for migrants
using a Heckman selection model (Table 9). Our objective here is not to provide a separate study
of returns to education in which we carefully identify education from unobserved ability bias. We
are simply interested understanding whether returns to education in the migrant labor market are
consistent with an observed decline in high school enrollment with expanding migrant opportunity.
For the selection equation, we use household land per capita and demographic characteristics (e.g.
household size, number of laborers, number of elderly in the household, the household dependency
ratio, the male/female ratio and number of children under 5). On average, we ﬁnd that an additional
year of education has a return in the migrant labor market of 2.9 percent (model 1).
To separately estimate the returns to years of schooling for primary and middle school, high
school, and post-high school education, we introduce a linear spline in model 2. We ﬁnd a higher
return to primary, middle school and post-secondary years of schooling than to high school. Specif-
ically, we estimate an average return of 4.0 percent to primary and middle school, but only a
23statistically insigniﬁcant 0.3 percent return to a year of high school (model 2).27 The return to
post-secondary education, consistent with ﬁndings reviewed by Cai, Park and Zhao (2004), is higher
than that for other types of education 4.7 percent, but also statistically insigniﬁcant.28
Moreover, the selection coeﬃcient on years of high school education is negatively related to
whether an individual is a migrant or not, implying that going to high school makes an individual
more likely to stay in the village. Returns to high school for rural migrants in urban areas are low,
while individuals with a high school education in rural areas are able to qualify for more lucrative
positions in village or township government or as managers (or owners) of local enterprises.
Eﬀects in Local Labor Markets: The Activities of High School Age Children
With the growth of migrant networks from the village and depletion of the local labor force, the
local labor market may also experience general equilibrium eﬀects that increase the opportunity
cost of enrolling in high school. As migrants leave the village, the local labor force decreases in
size, which in turn may increase the return to labor in home production (agricultural or non-
agricultural family businesses) or local oﬀ-farm wage employment suﬃciently to dissuade teenagers
from attending high school.29 While we lack individual information on daily earnings over time,
we can investigate the eﬀects of migrant networks on the activity choices of individuals of the age to
enter high school and in the two years after they would normally have enrolled in high school. We
expect that as the size of the migrant network increases, the local labor force is depleted and, as a
result, we may observe that teenagers are more likely to participate in local labor market activities.
In Table 10 we show the coeﬃcients on migrant network size from the IV-GMM linear prob-
ability model estimates and marginal eﬀects from IV-Probit estimates (Rivers and Vuong, 1988)
of individual activity choice. The IV-Probit models are included because the percentage of in-
dividuals actually entering the migrant or local oﬀ-farm labor markets is somewhat low, and we
are worried that the implied marginal eﬀects from the IV-GMM linear probability model may be
27In the spline model we estimate returns to education for years greater than or equal to 9 through 12 in order to
make sure that we are picking up returns to years of high school education for this range. Villages with ﬁve year
primary schools will have one year of high school pooled with grades 0 to 8.
28The estimated returns to schooling here are much lower than recent estimates of returns to urban workers. This
may reﬂect measurement error bias, measurement problems in the calculation of net daily migrant wages, or reﬂect
bias against rural migrants in urban labor markets.
29Figure 10, for example, shows suggestive trends indicating increases in long-term employment within the county
of high school age cohorts.
24biased. We observe that implied marginal eﬀects are quite similar across the two models, and we
thus prefer the IV-GMM results because these are again estimated with cluster corrected standard
errors robust to within village correlation.
The results imply that general equilibrium eﬀects may be taking place. As the size of the
migrant network expands, high school age individuals are more likely to be employed in both local
oﬀ-farm and migrant destinations. The increase in the probability they will be employed locally
oﬀ-farm can be explained by the reduction in the size of the local labor force. Moreover, the size
of the coeﬃcients increase for individuals one or two years out of high school. We do not observe
an increase in provision of labor on the family farm or in family businesses, but this activity choice
may be subject to greater error in reporting than wage employment.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The movement of rural laborers out of agriculture into urban and coastal areas has been an impor-
tant feature of China’s economic transition. While the opportunity to migrate has been important
for raising living standards in many areas of rural China, access to migrant opportunity appears
to create a disincentive for continued increases in educational attainment of rural youth. In this
paper, we show that relatively low returns to high school education for migrant workers provides
a possible explanation for the negative relationship. Since relatively high wages are available for
middle school graduates in migrant destinations with little increase in compensation for additional
education, families considering enro l l i n gt h e i rc h i l d r e ni nh i g hs c h o o lﬁnd the opportunity cost to
be too high.
It is plausible that institutional features of China’s economy continue to inﬂuence relative returns
to education for urban and rural registered residents and shape the disincentives for enrollment in
high school. Many cities still explicitly reserve some occupational categories for registered urban
residents, and even where this practice has been relaxed there is often de facto segregation of rural
residents into service sector, construction and other relatively low skill jobs that are unwanted by
urban residents.30 To the extent that migrant employees can earn signiﬁcantly higher wages in
30See Meng and Zhang (2001) for an empirical analysis on the Shanghai labor market and Solinger (1999) for a
description of the diﬀerences in treatment of migrant rural and urban residents in Wuhan.
25relatively unskilled employment in urban areas, the opportunity cost of high school enrollment may
well be higher than the returns to high school education. Given that an increasing share of urban
residents are completing university, the gap in educational attainment between youth growing up
in urban and rural areas is likely to reinforce barriers to economic mobility for rural residents and
their families even after they migrate to cities. Ending restrictions on the occupational categories
in which rural migrants may be employed may create frictions between urban and rural registered
migrants in the short-term, but may raise returns to high school education for rural youth and have
the salutary eﬀect of facilitating greater intergenerational economic mobility in the future.
The growing cost of university education and the lack of a well-functioning student loan program
may also contribute to a decline in the perceived return to high school education. The returns to
education in urban China are non-linear and driven primarily by increases in the returns to college
education (Cai, Park and Zhao, 2004; Heckman and Li, 2004). In fact, the primary return to high
school education may be as an input for post-secondary education (e.g. Appleton, Hoddinott, and
Knight, 1996). Combined with credit constraints and increasing college tuitions, the possibility
of college entrance may be perceived as extremely remote in rural areas, implying an even lower
expected return to enrollment in high school.
At present there is considerable concern about the potential consequences of growing inequality
across China’s regions and between rural and urban areas. The results presented in this paper
suggest that institutional features creating low returns to high school education for rural registered
families may contribute to persistence in unequal outcomes even as urbanization proceeds. In
order to avoid long-term distributional consequences of low returns to high school enrollment for
rural residents, China’s government should consider expanding subsidies for high school education
in rural areas and ending formal restrictions on occupational categories for employment of rural
registered individuals in urban areas. Finally, developing a more ﬂexible student loan system to
facilitate paying college tuitions may alter expectations regarding ability to enroll in college and
thus change incentives for high school enrollment in rural areas.
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Figure 2 
Share of Cohort Completing Middle School by Gender 
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Figure 3 
Share of Cohort Entering High School by Gender 
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Figure 4 
Age at Time of First Migration Experience 
Individuals Growing Up in RCRE Villages 
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Figure 5 
Share of Age Group with Temporary or Long-Term Migrant Employment 
Individuals Growing Up in RCRE Villages 
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
M
i
g
r
a
n
t
 
S
h
a
r
e
 
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
 
Year
15 and 16 Year Olds 17 and 18 Year Olds
19 and 20 Year Olds
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Figure 6 
Working Age Laborers from Village Employed as Migrants 
In Logs 
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Source:  RCRE Village Surveys (1986-2003), RCRE Supplemental Village Survey (2004). 
 
Figure 7 
Working Age Laborers from Village Employed as Migrants 
In Logs, Villages Receiving IDs in 1988 Excluded 
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Source:  RCRE Village Surveys (1986-2003), RCRE Supplemental Village Survey (2004). 
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Figure 8 
Share of Age Cohort Entering High School  
by Timing of ID Card Receipt 
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Source:  RCRE Supplemental Surveys (2004). 
 
Figure 9 
Share of Middle School Graduates Entering High School 
By Timing of  ID Card Receipt 
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Source:  RCRE Supplemental Surveys (2004). 
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Figure 10 
Share of Young Pursuing Activities other than Migrant Employment 
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Table 1 
Local Networks of Rural-Urban Migrants at Time of Migration 
Five-City CULS Migrant Survey* 
     
           
  
Source Community 
Location 
     
All 
Provinces 
4 RCRE 
Provinces 
Share of Migrants with:     
 Job  Arranged  Before  First Migration Experience  0.52  0.57 
 Job  Arranged  Before  Current Migration Experience  0.53  0.56 
  Some Acquaintance from Home Village in City Before Migrating  0.91  0.94 
       **Close Family Member in City Before Migration  0.35  0.35 
       **Extended Family Member in City Before Migration  0.52  0.58 
       **Hometown Acquiantances  0.65  0.67 
       Five or Fewer Hometown Acquaintances  0.39  0.44 
       More than Five Hometown Acquaintances  0.27  0.24 
  At Least One Local Acquaintance 0.09  0.08 
Number of Migrants  2,463  481 
*Respondents are holders of rural registration (hukou).  The survey was conducted in Fuzhou, Shanghai, 
Shenyang, Wuhan and Xian during late 2001.  Sample frames were assembled using information on 
distribution of migrants within cities from the 2000 Population Census.  After selecting neighborhoods through 
a proportional population sampling procedure, sample frames were assembled using residents’ committee 
records of migrant households and registers of migrants living on construction sites and held by local by police 
stations.  Very short-term migrants, who lack a residence that falls under the jurisdiction of either of these 
authorities, are unlikely to have made it into the sample frame. 
**A  close family member is adult sibling or member of nuclear family (e.g., spouse, child, parent).  An 
extended family member refers to cousins or other relatives.  Hometown acquaintances are unrelated, but 
known by the respondent. Note that migrants may have acquaintances in several categories, so that 
subcategories of acquaintances will add to more than 100. 
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Table 2 
Educational Attainment of Migrants 
 
Panel A. Education Attainment and Age at First Migration of Rural-Urban Migrants 
from Five-City CULS Migrant Survey* 
   Source  Community 
      All Provinces  4 RCRE Provinces 
Education    
 Elementary  or  Less  0.247  0.220 
  Some Middle School   0.086  0.096 
 Middle  School  0.485  0.501 
  Some High School  0.039  0.045 
 High  School  0.120  0.120 
  Some Post Secondary  0.009  0.011 
 College  0.010  0.012 
Number of Observations  2,463  481 
*Source: China Urban Labor Survey (see discussion on note of Table 1). 
 
Panel B. Evidence on Educational Attainment of Cross-Province Migrants from the 1990 
and 2000 Population Census 
   Source  Community 
    All Provinces  4 RCRE Provinces 
    
Educational Attainment of 
Individuals Migrating from the 
Province Between 1985 and 1990 
  
  Less than Middle School  0.348 0.317 
 Middle  School  0.341 0.411 
 High  School  0.162 0.158 
  College or Higher  0.148 0.114 
      
Educational Attainment of 
Individuals Migrating from the 
Province Between 1995 and 2000 
  
  Less than Middle School  0.245 0.249 
 Middle  School  0.462 0.518 
 High  School  0.154 0.132 
  College or Higher  0.148 0.101 
      
*Source: One Percent Sample of the 1990 and 2000 Population Census.  Includes cross-
province migrants from both urban and rural areas. 
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Table 3 
Average Village Characteristics in 1988 
by Timing of ID Card Distribution 
    Year ID Cards Were Issued 
    
prior to 
1988  in 1988  after 1988 
mean 0.399  0.242  0.246  Share of Productive Assets Owned by the Village 
Collective std.  dev  0.277  0.189  0.276 
mean 414.3  349.3  405.1  Mean Consumption Per Capita 
std. dev  154.6  131.6  86.9 
Mean Income Per Capita*  mean  627.2  481.5  558.1 
 std.  dev  243.3  183.5  162.4 
Cultivable Share of Total Land Area  mean  0.691  0.546  0.512 
 std.  dev  0.277  0.273  0.309 
Share in Mountains  mean  0.14  0.24  0.3 
 std.  dev  0.36  0.43  0.48 
Share Near a City  mean  0.21  0.04  0.08 
 std.  dev  0.43  0.20  0.28 
Cropped Land Gini Ratio  mean  0.21  0.15  0.17 
 std.  dev  0.07  0.05  0.05 
Average Household Size  mean  4.40  4.72  4.68 
 std.  dev  0.66  0.47  0.53 
Total Village Land  mean  4508  4633  7676 
 std.  dev  4694  4676  9401 
Male Share in Population  mean  0.51  0.51  0.50 
 std.  dev  0.02  0.02  0.02 
mean 0.27  0.14  0.16  Share of Labor Force Earning Wage Locally 
std. dev  0.21  0.12  0.22 
Village Population  mean  1646  1284  1501 
 std.  dev  1089  548  925 
Village Consumption Per Capita Gini  mean  0.18  0.16  0.16 
 std.  dev  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Village Income Per Capita Gini  mean  0.23  0.22  0.21 
 std.  dev  0.07  0.05  0.07 
Average Years of Schooling, aged 18-22  mean  8.75  7.56  7.50 
 std.  dev  3.44  2.02  2.03 
Share of 15-18 Year Olds Enrolled in High School  mean  0.41  0.35  0.31 
 std.  dev  0.25  0.16  0.16 
Observations   14  25  13 
Notes:   
*Indicates difference is statistically signicant at the 10th Percentile. 
1. Consumption and income per capita are reported in 1986 RMB Yuan. 
2. Sources:  RCRE Household and Village Surveys (1986 to 2003), and RCRE Supplemental Surveys (2004). 
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Table 4 
Reported Age Starting Primary School 
Individuals Age 10 to 34 in 2000 
    
Age Number  Share 
4 6 0.002 
5 56 0.021 
6 530 0.198 
7 1336 0.499 
8 639 0.239 
9 83 0.031 
10 18  0.007 
11 6  0.002 
12 2  0.001 
13 2  0.001 
14 1  0.000 
Source: China Center for Agricultural Policy (CCAP) Data 
Set, 2000.  See the Appendix of de Brauw et al (2003) for a 
description of the CCAP survey. 
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Table 5 
Proportion of Individuals Staying in School 
by Grade and Primary School Type 
      
  Six Year Primary Schools  Five Year Primary Schools 
Grade  Proportion N Proportion N 
2 1.00  1310  1.00  4193 
3 1.00  1310  0.99  4186 
4 1.00  1296  0.99  4118 
5 0.99  1285  0.98  4019 
6 0.98  1257  0.91  3904 
7 0.95  1211  0.95  3484 
8 0.92  1122  0.87  3238 
9 0.90  1011  0.43  2712 
10 0.47  877  0.68  1134 
11  0.95 388 0.84 729 
12  0.91 351 0.62 574 
13  0.36 305 0.59 329 
14  0.91 100 0.81 183 
15 0.83  83  0.58  138 
16 0.36  61  0.32  74 
17 0.40  20  0.21  24 
18 0.80  5  0.50  4 
19 0.00  3  0.50  2 
20 0.00  0  0.00  1 
Notes: Proportions are conditional on school enrollment the previous year. 
Assumes children start school at age 7 and do not skip.   
Source: RCRE Supplemental Survey (2004).    
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Table 6 
What Factors Determine the Size of the Village Migrant Network? 
First-Stage Regression Using the Sample of Individuals Completing Middle School, 1986-2003 
 
                
  Dependent Variable: Number of Registered Village Residents Working as Migrants 
Model  1a  1b  1c  2  3 4 5 
Years Since IDs issued  0.721  -0.016  -0.720  -0.629  -0.621 -0.632 -0.631 
  (0.122)  (0.225) (0.367) (0.332) (0.333)  (0.333)  (0.333) 
Years Since IDs Issued   -0.041  0.074  0.277  0.266  0.264  0.267  0.267 
Squared  (0.007)  (0.030) (0.089) (0.081) (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.081) 
Years Since IDs Issued     -0.004  -0.022  -0.024  -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 
Cubed    (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
(Years Since IDs Issued)
4      0.005  0.006  0.006 0.006 0.006 
      (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
      0.447  0.430 0.393 0.387  Ln(Village Average 
Income Per Capita)        (0.627)  (0.626)  (0.627)  (0.627) 
Total Land in Village (Mu)        0.019  0.019  0.018  0.018 
        (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Cultivable Land Gini         3.520  3.560  3.631  3.661 
Coefficient        (2.143)  (2.147) (2.147) (2.149) 
Size of Village Workforce        0.074  0.074  0.075  0.075 
        (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cultivable Share of         3.094  3.103  3.068  3.061 
Village  Land        (1.462)  (1.462) (1.463) (1.464) 
Gender (1=male,           -0.479  -0.509  -0.503 
0=female)          (0.238) (0.238) (0.239) 
First Born? (1=yes, 0=no)          -0.067  -0.066  0.023 
          (0.232) (0.234) (0.352) 
First Born in Household is           0.140  0.156  0.102 
Male?  (1=yes,  0=no)          (0.258) (0.258) (0.286) 
Father’s Years of             -0.076  -0.076 
Schooling         (0.050)  (0.050) 
Mother’s Years of             0.088  0.088 
Schooling         (0.054)  (0.054) 
Number of Potential               0.117 
Migrants,  Male           (0.259) 
Number of Potential               0.010 
Migrants,  Female           (0.220) 
            
Number  of  Observations 3160  3160 3160 3068 3068  3068  3068 
r2  0.419  0.422 0.423 0.451 0.452  0.453  0.453 
F-Statistic on Instruments  18.3  17.28  14.46  10.06  9.98  10.2  10.19 
Partial r2, Instruments  0.011  0.016 0.018 0.013 0.013  0.013  0.013 
Notes: Columns 1c through 5 are the first stage of instrumental variable regressions shown in models 1 to 5 of Table 
7.  The F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on the instruments are zero.   All F statistics are 
significant at the one percent level.  All regressions control for village fixed effects (using a village demeaned 
specification) and include year dummy variables.  Models 1c through 2 are estimated at the village level in Appendix 
Table A.2 
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Table 7 
Determinants of High School Enrollment  
Conditional on Completing Middle School, 1986-2003 
   Dependent Variable:  Enroll in High School Next Year = 1 
Model  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
   OLS  IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM  IV-GMM  IV-GMM
(Number of Migrants from   -0.001  -0.029 -0.049 -0.048 -0.047 -0.047 -0.045 
Village)/10  (0.002) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.034) 
Gender (1=male)        0.025  0.032  0.030  0.035 
       (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.031) 
     0.028  0.005  -0.045  -0.057  First Born (1=yes) 
     (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.037) 
First Born in Household        -0.058  -0.069  -0.059  -0.058 
was Male (1=yes)        (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.029) 
      0.021  0.021  0.022  Father's Years of Schooling 
      (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
      0.033  0.033  0.033  Mother's Years of Schooling 
      (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
       -0.048  -0.056  Number of Potential Migrants, 
Household, Male         (0.022)  (0.025) 
       -0.030  -0.036  Number of Potential Migrants, 
Household, Female         (0.015)  (0.017) 
    0.051 0.050 0.043 0.044 0.000  ln(Village Mean Income Per Capita) 
    (0.176) (0.172) (0.172) (0.173) (0.189) 
Village Total Land      -0.024  -0.021  -0.014  -0.026  -0.023 
      (0.349) (0.345) (0.348) (0.349) (0.530) 
    0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002  Village Cultivable Land Per Capita Gini 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
(Village Labor Force)/10      0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.003 
      (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
    0.363 0.375 0.291 0.296 0.397  Cultivable Share of Village Land 
    (0.279) (0.274) (0.258) (0.259) (0.426) 
Additional Time-Varying Village 
Variables?  no no no no no No  yes 
Chi-Square Test, Time-Varying Village 
Variables         1.41 
p-value,  Chi-Square  Test        0.965 
Over-ID Test: Hansen J-Statistic    0.449 0.765 1.186 1.253 1.321 1.820 
                       P-value, J-statistic    0.930 0.858 0.756 0.740 0.724 0.611 
F-Test   14.46  10.06  9.98  10.2  10.19  4.42 
P-value,  F-statistic    0 0 0 0 0  0.015 
Partial r2    0.018  0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.006 
Hahn-Hausman test, t statistic  -0.69 -0.83 -0.75 -0.79 -0.78 -0.41 
Hahn-Hausman, p value    0.490 0.407 0.453 0.430 0.435 0.682 
Number  of  Obs.  3160 3160 3068 3068 3068 3068 3068 
Notes:   In parentheses, we show robust standard errors that allow for arbitrary correlation within villages.  All regressions 
control for village fixed effects and include year dummies.  The additional time varying village level variables include the 
average proportion of households with non-agricultural self-employment,  the share of grain sold at quote, the logarithm of 
average household wealth, the share of land allocated to aquaculture, the share of land allocated to forestry, and , the share of 
land allocated to orchards.  Models 1-6 are estimated using instrumental variables generalized method of moments. 
 
42 
Table 8 
Is the Effect of Migrant Opportunity on High School Enrollment Robust to  
Unexpected Shocks to Wealth? 
              
  Dependent Variable:  Enroll in High School Next Year = 1 
Model  1 2 3 4 
-0.029 -0.029 -0.028 -0.029  (Number of Migrants from Village)/10 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
        
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.006  July-November Lagged Rainfall Shock 
Squared  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
        
 -0.004     Lagged Rainfall Shock*(Father has High 
School Education)   (0.736)    
        
   0.001    Lagged Rainfall Shock Squared * Birth 
Order     (0.001)   
        
    -0.008  Lagged Rainfall Shock Squared * First 
Born      (0.002) 
        
        
ID Cards  ID Cards  ID Cards  ID Cards  Instruments: 
    
Over-ID Test:  Hansen J-Statistic  3.793  3.793  3.839  3.632 
                         J-Statistic, P-value  0.285  0.285  0.279  0.304 
        
F-Test  11.92 11.85 11.91 11.91 
F-Probability  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
Number  of  Obs.  2786 2786 2786 2786 
Notes:   In parentheses, we show robust standard errors that allow for arbitrary correlation within villages.  
All regressions control for village fixed effects and include year dummies and the village and individual 
level controls listed in column 5 of Table 7.  All models are estimated using instrumental variables 
generalized method of moments.   
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Table 9 
Returns to Education Among Migrants from RCRE Villages in 2003 
Heckman Selection Models 
              
  Model 1  Model 2 
 
ln(Daily 
Migrant 
Wage) 
Migrant?        
(1= Yes) 
ln(Daily 
Migrant 
Wage) 
Migrant?        
(1= Yes) 
Years of Schooling  0.029  -0.007  --  -- 
 (0.012)  (0.014)     
0<=Years of Schooling <9  --  --  0.040  0.072 
     (0.019)  (0.022) 
9<=Years of Schooling <12  --  --  0.003  -0.126 
     (0.034)  (0.036) 
Years of Schooling>=12  --  --  0.047  -0.029 
     (0.059)  (0.068) 
Age  0.146 0.285 0.149 0.286 
  (0.041) (0.043) (0.034) (0.042) 
Age  Squared  -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Male  0.213 0.311 0.217 0.307 
  (0.053) (0.061) (0.052) (0.061) 
Fathers Years of Education  -0.013 -0.0283 -0.012  -0.027 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
Mothers Years of Education  0.008  -0.005  0.008  -0.005 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) 
Household  Size  -- -0.010 -- -0.020 
   (0.044)  (0.044) 
Number of Adult Laborers  --  0.054  --  0.057 
   (0.046)  (0.046) 
Household Land Per Capita  --  -0.115  --  -0.126 
   (0.052)  (0.052) 
Number of Elderly in Household  --  -0.054  --  -0.045 
   (0.038)  (0.038) 
Dependency  Ratio  -- -0.079 -- -0.087 
   (0.178)  (0.179) 
Male/Female  Ratio  -- -0.354 -- -0.317 
   (0.202)  (0.202) 
Number of Children Under 5  --  -0.197  --  -0.203 
   (0.068)  (0.069) 
Number of Observations  3880  3880 
Censored Observations  3101  2101 
Uncensored Observations  779  779 
 Notes:  Individual information necessary to estimate daily returns to education from migrant employment are only 
available for the 2003 survey.  We estimate returns to education in migrant employment for children of the 
household head and spouse who are under 50 and over 15 years of age.  Robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Children Graduating from Middle School 
Selected Variables, for Selected Years 
 All  Year 
  Years 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
Individual Level Variables         
Enrolled  in  High  School?  (1=yes)  0.43 0.32 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.47 0.47 
  (0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) 
Gender  (1=male)  0.57 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.53 0.53 0.48 
  (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
0.45 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.52 0.50 0.37  First Born (1=yes) 
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) 
1.87 1.92 1.94 1.92 1.76 1.71 1.94  Birth Order 
(1.04) (1.12) (1.18) (1.14) (1.02) (0.85) (0.93) 
Household Level Variables         
First  Born  in  Household  0.40 0.28 0.44 0.43 0.38 0.42 0.43 
was  Male  (1=yes)  (0.50) (0.45) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) 
    
6.39 5.44 5.52 6.25 6.47 7.27 6.79  Father's Years of Schooling 
(3.21) (3.28) (3.28) (3.32) (3.16) (3.06) (3.04) 
4.22 3.30 3.07 3.67 4.23 5.02 5.14  Mother's Years of Schooling 
(3.30) (3.03) (2.99) (3.22) (3.36) (3.17) (3.32) 
0.46 0.30 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.54  Number of Potential Migrants, 
Household, Male  (0.62) (0.48) (0.58) (0.61) (0.59) (0.62) (0.62) 
0.49 0.25 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.47 0.59  Number of Potential Migrants, 
Household, Female  (0.71) (0.48) (0.69) (0.81) (0.81) (0.66) (0.79) 
Village Level Variables         
Number of Migrants from   90.5  18.6  18.6  74.0  107.4  99.3  188 
Village  (110) (28.7) (27.0) (83.7)  (119.2)  (83.5) (136) 
    
6.42 6.20 6.21 6.22 6.52 6.52 6.66  ln(Village Mean Income Per Capita) 
(0.39) (0.32) (0.35) (0.31) (0.32) (0.38) (0.31) 
ln(Village  Mean  Wealth  Per  Capita)  8.80 8.62 8.51 8.69 8.89 8.93 9.07 
  (0.55) (0.48) (0.57) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.45) 
Appendix Table 1 Continued on Next Page
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Appendix Table 1 (Continued) 
  All  Year 
  Years  1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
         
Village Total Land (mu)  5090  4820  5080  4870  5200  5100  5760 
  (5710) (5110) (5190) (5500) (5310) (6240) (6460) 
         
0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.25  Village Cultivable Land Per Capita 
Gini  (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) 
         
Village  Labor  Force  861 780 851 867 899 820 948 
  (486) (352) (419) (433) (470) (487) (559) 
         
0.58 0.60 0.57 0.62 0.55 0.57 0.54  Cultivable Share of Village Land 
(0.28) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31) 
        
7.37 0.33 2.12 4.86 7.87  11.01  13.86  Years Since IDs Issued 
(5.11) (1.02) (1.65) (2.07) (2.20) (2.23) (2.28) 
        
0.58 0.60 0.57 0.62 0.55 0.57 0.54  Cultivable Share of Village Land 
(0.28) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31) 
        
0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.19  Forest Share of Village Land 
(0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25) (0.28) (0.30) 
        
0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.06  Orchards Share of Village Land 
(0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
        
         
0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05  Aquaculture Share of Village Land 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
        
0.56 0.66 0.66 0.55 0.57 0.49 0.51  Share of Households with Non-
Agricultural Self-Employment Income  (0.28) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.28) (0.26) 
        
0.09 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.03  Quota Share of Grain Produced 
(0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) 
        
0.15 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02  Scaled Lagged July-November 
Rainfall Shock, Squared  (2.12) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
        
Number  of  Observations  3068  158 162 237 262 238 187 
Notes: The first column includes descriptive statistics for all years; the second through seventh columns include 
descriptive statistics for selected years. 
Sources: RCRE Supplemental Survey (2004), Annual RCRE Household and Village Surveys (1986-1991, 1993, 1995-
2003).  
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Appendix Table A2 
What Factors Determine the Size of the Village Migrant Network? 
First-Stage Regression Using the Sample of Village-Year Observations, 1986-2003 
              
 
Dependent Variable: Number of Registered Village Residents 
Working as Migrants 
Model 1a  1b  1c  2 
Years Since IDs issued  1.385  0.417  0.038  -0.156 
  0.469 0.702 1.012 0.910 
        
Years Since IDs Issued   -0.041  0.085  0.182  0.224 
Squared  0.016 0.070 0.199 0.180 
        
Years Since IDs Issued     -0.005  -0.013  -0.019 
Cubed   0.003  0.017  0.015 
        
(Years Since IDs Issued)
4     0.002  0.004 
     0.004  0.004 
        
Ln(Village Average 
Income Per Capita)        0.966 
       1.266 
        
Total Land in Village (Mu)        0.029 
       0.033 
        
Cultivable Land Gini         6.413 
Coefficient       3.965 
        
Size of Village Workforce        0.078 
       0.014 
        
Cultivable Share of         2.529 
Village Land        3.119 
        
Number  of  Obs.  762 762 762 739 
F-Test  4.62 4.23 3.23 2.78 
F-Probability  0.0102 0.0057 0.0121 0.0261 
partial  r2,  Instruments  0.0131 0.0178 0.0182 0.0165 
Notes: The F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients on the instruments are zero. All 
regressions control for village fixed effects and include year dummy variables. 
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